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Abstract
We study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which a risk-neutral agent
with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large
but relatively infrequent losses. Firm size can be decreased at no cost, or increased
subject to adjustment costs. In the optimal contract, investment takes place only if a
long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring. Then, if good performance
continues, the agent is paid. As soon as a loss occurs, payments to the agent are
suspended, and so is investment if further losses occur. Accumulated bad performance
leads to downsizing. We derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its
asymptotic growth rate, and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually
goes to zero, or grows without bounds.
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1 Introduction
Industrial and financial firms are subject to large risks: the former are prone to accidents
and the latter are exposed to sharp drops in the value of their assets. Preventing these
risks requires managerial effort. Systematic analyses of industrial accidents point to the
role of human deficiencies and inadequate levels of care.1 A striking illustration is offered
by the explosion at the BP Texas refinery in March 2005. After investigating the case,
the Baker Panel concluded: “BP executive and corporate refining management have not
provided effective process safety leadership.”2 Similarly, the large losses incurred by banks
and insurance companies during the recent financial crisis were in part due to insufficient
risk control. These large risks present a major challenge to firms, investors and citizens.
This paper studies the design of incentives to mitigate them.
One way to stimulate the prevention of large risks would be to make managers and
firms bear the social costs that they generate. Yet, this is often impossible in practice,
because total damages often exceed the wealth of managers and even the net worth of firms,
while the former are protected by limited liability and the latter by bankruptcy laws.3 This
curbs managers’ incentives to reduce the risk of losses that exceed the value of their own
assets.4 Of course, if the risk prevention activities undertaken by managers were observable,
it would be straightforward to design compensation schemes that would induce them to take
socially optimal levels of risk. To a large extent, however, these activities are unobservable
by external parties, which leads to a moral hazard problem.
Besides informational asymmetries, another important aspect of large risks lies in their
timing. Large losses are relatively rare events that contrast with day-to-day firm operations
and cash-flows.5 It is therefore natural to study large risk prevention in a dynamic set-up,
where the timing of losses differs from that of operations. To do so, we focus on the simplest
1See for instance Leplat and Rasmussen (1984), Gordon, Flin, Mearns and Fleming (1996) or Hollnagel
(2002).
2“The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel,” January 16, 2007. Also,
Chemical Safety Board Chairman Carolyn W. Merritt stated that “BP’s global management was aware
of problems with maintenance, spending, and infrastructure well before March 2005. [...] Unsafe and
antiquated equipment designs were left in place, and unacceptable deficiencies in preventative maintenance
were tolerated,” “CSB Investigation of BP Texas City Refinery Disaster Continues as Organizational Issues
are Probed,” CSB News Release, October 30, 2006.
3For instance, Katzman (1988) report that “In Ohio v. Kovacs (U.S.S.C. 83–1020), the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that an industrial polluter can escape an order to clean up a toxic waste site under
the umbrella of federal bankruptcy.” Similarly, the social losses created by the recent financial crisis exceeded
by far the assets one could withhold from financial executives.
4Shavell (1984, 1986) discusses how a party’s inability to pay for the full magnitude of harm done dilutes
its incentives to reduce risk.
5From now on, we shall generically refer to any realization of a large risk as a loss.
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model: operating cash-flows are constant per unit of time, while losses occur according to a
Poisson process whose intensity depends on the level of risk prevention.
In this context, we study the optimal contract between a principal and an agent that
provides the latter with appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of losses under dynamic
moral hazard. The agent, who can be thought of as an entrepreneur or a manager running a
business, is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability. She can exert effort to reduce the
instantaneous probability of losses.6 Effort is costly to the agent and unobservable by other
parties. The project run by the agent can expand, through investment, or shrink, through
downsizing. While downsizing is unconstrained, we assume that the pace of investment is
limited by adjustment costs, in the spirit of Hayashi (1982) or Kydland and Prescott (1982).
We also assume constant returns to scale, in that downsizing and investment affect by the
same factor the operating profits of the project, the social costs of accidents, and the private
benefits that the agent derives from shirking. This assumption implies that the principal’s
value function is homogeneous in size and enables us to characterize the optimal contract
explicitly. However, as discussed in the paper, some of our key qualitative results are robust
to relaxing the constant returns to scale assumption.
The optimal contract maximizes the expected value that the principal derives from an
incentive feasible risk prevention policy. It relies on two instruments: positive payments to
the agent, and project size management through downsizing and investment. While these
decisions are functions of the entire past history of the loss process, this complex history
dependence can be summarized by two state variables: the size of the project, and the
continuation utility of the agent. The former reflects the history of past downsizing and
investment decisions, while the latter reflects the prospect of future payments to the agent.
The evolution of the agent’s continuation utility mirrors the dynamics of losses, and thus
serves as a track record of the agent’s performance.7 We characterize the compensation and
size management policy arising in the optimal contract.
First consider the compensation policy. To motivate the agent, the optimal contract
relies on the promise of payments after good performance and the threat of reductions in
her continuation utility after losses. When the track record of the agent is relatively poor,
there is a probation phase during which she does not receive any payment. As long as no
loss occurs, the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent increases until it reaches a
6Unlike in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or Akerlof and Katz (1989), effort in our model merely makes losses
less likely, but does not eliminate them altogether. As a result, losses do occur on the equilibrium path, and
it is no longer optimal to systematically terminate the principal-agent relationship following a loss.
7That the optimal contract exhibits memory is a standard feature of dynamic moral hazard models, see
for instance Rogerson (1985).
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threshold at which she receives a constant wage per unit of time and size of the project,
such that her size-adjusted continuation utility remains constant. As soon as a loss occurs,
the continuation utility of the agent undergoes a sharp reduction and the contract reverts to
the probation phase. The magnitude of that reduction in the agent’s continuation utility is
pinned down by the incentive compatibility constraint. The more severe the moral hazard
problem, and the larger the project, the greater the punishment. The induced sensitivity of
the agent’s continuation utility to the random occurrence of losses is socially costly because
the principal’s value function is concave in that state variable. Therefore, it is optimal to
set the reduction in the agent’s continuation utility following a loss to the minimum level
consistent with incentive compatibility.
Next consider the dynamics of the size of the project. In the first-best, there is no need
for downsizing. Since the project has positive net present value, investment then always
takes place at the highest feasible rate in order to maximize the size of the project. In the
second-best, however, the size of the project is lower than in the first-best. The intuition is
the following. As mentioned above, the agent is partly motivated by the threat of reductions
in her continuation utility in case of bad performance. Yet, when the continuation utility of
the agent is low, the threat to reduce it further has limited bite, because of limited liability.
To cope with this limitation, it can be necessary to lower the agent’s temptation to shirk by
reducing the scale of operations after losses. Apart from such circumstances, and in particular
when no loss occurs, the project is never downsized. In addition to downsizing, moral hazard
also affects the size of the project through its impact on investment. Since increases in the
size of the project raise the temptation to shirk, investment can take place only when the
agent has enough at stake in the project, that is, when her track record has been good
enough for her continuation utility to reach a given threshold. While payments when they
occur are costly for the principal, investment benefits both parties. As long as investment
takes place, the total size of the pie grows, which in turn makes delaying the compensation
of the agent less costly. Thus it is efficient to invest before actually compensating the agent.
Note that the sequencing of compensation and investment is reversed in the first-best. This
is because the agent, who is assumed to be more impatient than the principal, then receives
all her compensation at time zero, before any investment actually takes place.
We obtain an explicit formula mapping the path of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation
utility into the size of the project. If one interprets the latter as firm size, this formula exactly
spells out how firm size grows, stays constant or declines over time. Relying on asymptotic
theory for Markov ergodic processes, we then characterize the long-run growth rate of the
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firm. In the first-best, firm size goes to infinity at a constant rate. Our formula for the
long-run growth rate of the firm shows how, in the second-best, this trend in firm size is
reduced by downsizing and possibly lower investment rates. When the adjustment costs are
high, firm size eventually goes to zero. By contrast, when both the adjustments costs and
the frequency of losses are low, firm size eventually goes to infinity, although more slowly
than in the first-best.
Our paper belongs to the rich and growing literature on dynamic moral hazard that uses
recursive techniques to characterize optimal dynamic contracts.8 One of our contributions
relative to this literature is to study the case where moral hazard is about large but relatively
infrequent risks. As illustrated by recent industrial accidents or by the recent financial
crisis, preventing such risks is a major challenge. We show that optimal contracts that
mitigate the risk of infrequent but large losses differ markedly from those prevailing when
fluctuations in the output process are frequent but infinitesimal. In the latter, as illustrated
by the Brownian motion models of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin
and Rochet (2007) or Sannikov (2008), the continuation utility of the agent continuously
fluctuates until it reaches zero, an event that is predictable. At this point, the project is
liquidated. In contrast, with Poisson risk, the continuation utility of the agent increases
smoothly most of the time, but incurs sharp decreases when losses occur. In this context,
incentive compatibility together with limited liability imply unpredictable downsizing, unlike
in the Brownian case.
Another contribution of this paper relative to the literature is to analyze the interplay
between incentives considerations and firm size dynamics, and in particular to study the long-
run impact of downsizing and investment on firm size under moral hazard. Our analysis of
the interactions between incentives and investment is in line with DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007a). In a finite horizon, discrete-time framework, they derive a number of predictions
regarding the relationship between current investment, current and past cash-flows, and the
agent’s compensation. They show that these predictions are relatively insensitive to the
specific nature of the agency problem, provided its static version has a certain structure.
Thanks to the finiteness of the horizon, these results are derived recursively, starting from
the final period. Our analysis first differs from DeMarzo and Fishman’s (2007a) in that
our starting point is a stationary continuous-time model, which raises further conceptual
8See for instance Green (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990) or Phelan and
Townsend (1991) for seminal contributions along these lines. By focusing on the case where the agent is
risk-neutral, with limited liability, our model is in line with the recent papers by Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, 2007b).
4
and technical difficulties. Second, in order to derive sharper implications from the analysis,
we consider a particular type of informational friction, namely a moral hazard problem
with Poisson uncertainty. This modeling approach enables us to precisely characterize the
properties of the optimal contract, to provide an explicit formula for the dynamics of firm
size, and ultimately to conduct an asymptotic analysis of its long-run evolution and that of
the agent’s utility. In particular, a key insight of our analysis is that, when investment is
taken into account, it need not be the case that the firm eventually vanishes and that the
agent’s utility eventually goes to zero. This contrasts with the classic immiseration result
of Thomas and Worrall (1990). This also contrasts with the contemporaneous work by
DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2008), who study the dynamics of average and marginal
q in a Brownian model of agency and investment with convex adjustment costs and constant
returns to scale. In their model, as in ours, the agent’s continuation utility and the current
capital stock are sufficient statistics for the optimal contract. But an important difference
is that, in DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2008), the firm will eventually be liquidated
when the agent’s size-adjusted utility reaches zero, which occurs with probability one. By
contrast, in our Poisson model, the size-adjusted utility of the agent is bounded away from
zero, and incentives are provided by partial downsizing instead of outright liquidation. As
a result, the firm can grow without bounds when adjustment costs are low enough so that
investment outweighs downsizing.
In the context of a political economy model, Myerson (2008) contemporaneously offers an
analysis of dynamic moral hazard in a Poisson framework. A distinctive feature of our paper
is that we analyze the impact of investment on the principal-agent relationship. Moreover,
Myerson (2008) considers the case where the principal and the agent have identical discount
rates. This case, however, is not conducive to continuous-time analysis, as an optimal
contract does not exist. To cope with this difficulty, Myerson (2008) imposes an exogenous
upper bound on the continuation utility of the agent. By contrast, we do not impose such a
constraint on the set of feasible contracts. Instead, we consider the case where the principal
is less impatient than the agent. While this makes the formal analysis more complex, this
also restores the existence of an unconstrained optimal contract.
Sannikov (2005) also uses a Poisson payoff structure. A key difference with our analysis
lies in the way output is affected by the jumps of the Poisson process. In Sannikov (2005),
jumps correspond to positive cash-flow shocks, while in our model they correspond to losses
that are less likely to occur if the agent exerts effort.9 This leads to qualitatively very
9Thus jumps in our model are bad news in the sense of Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991).
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different results. While downsizing is a key feature of our optimal contract, as it ensures
that incentives can still be provided following a long sequence of losses, it plays no role
in Sannikov (2005). Liquidation in his model is still required to provide incentives, but it
corresponds to a predictable event: if a sufficiently long period of time elapses during which
the agent reports no cash-flow, the firm is liquidated. By contrast, downsizing in our model
is unpredictable.10
Our paper is also related to the literature on accident law. Shavell (1986, 2000) argues
that the desirability of liability insurance depends on the ability of insurers to monitor the
firm’s prevention effort, and to link insurance premia to the observed level of care. If insurers
cannot observe the firm’s level of care, making full liability insurance mandatory results in
no care at all being taken.11 In our dynamic analysis, the optimal contract ties the firm’s
allowed activity level to its performance record: following a series of losses, the firm can be
forbidden to engage at full scale in its risky activity. These instruments provide the manager
of the firm with dynamic incentives to exert the appropriate risk prevention effort, although
the latter is not observed by the principal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 formulates
the incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints. Section 4 characterizes the
optimal contract under maximal risk prevention. Based on this analysis, Section 5 studies
the dynamics of firm size. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results. Section 7 derives
some empirical implications of our theoretical analysis. Section 8 concludes. Sketches of
proofs are provided in the appendix. Complete proofs are available in the supplement to
this paper (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2009)).
2 The Model
There are two players, a principal and an agent. The agent can run a potentially profitable
project for which she has unique necessary skills.12 However, this project entails costs, and
the agent has limited liability and no initial cash. By contrast, the principal has unlimited
liability and is able to cover the costs. One can think of the agent as an entrepreneur or a
manager running a business, and of the principal as a financier, an insurance company, or
10Poisson processes have also proved useful in the theory of repeated games with imperfect monitoring,
see for instance Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), Kalesnik (2005) and Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2009).
Our focus differs from theirs in that we consider a full commitment contracting environment, in which we
explicitly characterize the optimal incentive compatible contract.
11See Jost (1996) and Polborn (1998) for important extensions and qualifications of this argument.
12Empirically, this assumption is particularly relevant in the case of small businesses, where the
entrepreneur-manager is often indispensable for operating the firm efficiently (Sraer and Thesmar (2007)).
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society at large.
Time is continuous and the project can be operated over an infinite horizon. The two
players are risk-neutral. The principal discounts the future at rate r > 0 and the agent at rate
ρ > r, which makes her more impatient than the principal. This introduces a wedge between
the valuation of future transfers by the principal and the agent, and rules out indefinitely
postponing payments to the latter. Without loss of generality, we normalize to 0 the set-up
cost of the project.
At any time t, the size Xt of the project can be scaled up or down. There are no
constraints on downsizing: any fraction of the assets between 0 and 1 can be instantaneously
liquidated. For simplicity, we normalize the maximal possible initial size of the project to 1,
and assume that the liquidation value of the assets is 0. The project can also be expanded, at
unit cost c ≥ 0. The rate at which such investments can take place is constrained, however.
This reflects for instance that new plants cannot be built instantaneously, or that the inflow
of new skilled workers is constrained by search and training. Consistent with this, we shall
assume that the instantaneous growth rate gt of the project is at most equal to γ ∈ (0, r).
This is in line with the macroeconomic literature emphasizing the delays and costs associated
with investment, such as time-to-build constraints (Kydland and Prescott (1982)) or convex
adjustment costs (Hayashi (1982)). Our formulation corresponds to a simple version of the
adjustment cost model in which there are no adjustment costs up to an instantaneous size
adjustment Xtγdt, and infinite adjustment costs beyond this point.
Operating profits per unit of time are equal toXtµ, where µ > 0 is a constant representing
day-to-day size-adjusted operating profits. While such profits are constant, the project is
subject to the risk of large losses. In the case of a manufacturing firm, such losses can be
generated by a severe accident. In the case of a financial firm, they can result from a sudden
and sharp decrease in the value of the assets that the firm invested in. The occurrence of
these losses is modeled as a point process N = {Nt}t≥0, where for each t ≥ 0, Nt is the
number of losses up to and including time t. Denote by (Tk)k≥1 the successive random times
at which these losses occur. A loss generates costs that are borne by the principal rather
than by the agent. For example, an oil spill imposes huge damages on the environment and
on the inhabitants of the affected region, but has limited direct impact on the manager of
the oil company. Or, in the case of financial firms, the losses incurred by many banks in 2007
and 2008 exceeded what they could cope with, and governments and taxpayers had to bear
the costs. To capture this in our model, we assume that the agent has limited liability and
cannot be held responsible for these losses in excess of her current wealth, so that it is the
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principal who has to incur the costs. We assume that, like operating profits, losses increase
linearly with the size of the project. Thus, if there is a loss at time t, the corresponding cost
is XtC, where C > 0 is the size-adjusted cost. Overall, the net output flow generated by the
project during the infinitesimal time interval (t, t+ dt] is Xt(µdt− CdNt).
By exerting effort, the agent affects the probability with which losses occur: a higher
effort reduces the probability Λtdt that a loss occurs during (t, t + dt]. For simplicity, we
consider only two levels of effort, corresponding to Λt = λ > 0 and Λt = λ + ∆λ, with
∆λ > 0. To model the cost of effort, we adopt the same convention as Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1997): if the agent shirks at time t, that is if Λt = λ + ∆λ, she obtains a private
benefit XtB; by contrast, if the agent exerts effort at time t, that is if Λt = λ, she obtains
no private benefit. This formulation is similar to one in which the agent incurs a constant
cost per unit of time and per unit of size of the project when exerting effort, and no cost
when shirking.
Remark It is natural to assume that operating profits and losses are increasing in the size
of the project. It is also natural to assume that the opportunity cost of risk prevention
is increasing in the size of the project: it takes more time, effort and energy to check
compliance and monitor safety processes in two plants than in a single plant, or for a large
trading room with many traders than for a small one. Observe however that we require
more than monotonicity, since we assume that operating profits, losses and private benefits
are linear in the size of the project. This constant returns to scale assumption is made
for tractability. As shown in Section 4, it implies that the value function solution to the
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation (23) is homogeneous of degree one, which considerably
simplifies the characterization of the optimal contract. Yet, even without this assumption,
some of the qualitative features of our analysis are upheld, as discussed in Section 6.
We assume throughout the paper that
(1)
µ− λC
r
> c
and that
(2) ∆λC > B.
The left-hand side of (1) is the present value of the net expected cash-flow generated by one
unit of capacity over an infinite horizon when the agent always exerts effort. The right-hand
side of (1) is the cost of an additional unit of capacity. Condition (1) implies that the project
has positive net present value and that investment is desirable when the agent always exerts
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effort. The left-hand side of (2) is the size-adjusted expected social cost of increased risk
when the agent shirks. The right-hand side of (2) is the size-adjusted private benefit from
shirking. Condition (2) implies that in the absence of moral hazard, it is socially optimal to
require the agent to always exert effort. The first-best policy can therefore be characterized
as follows: first, the project is initiated at its maximal capacity of 1, and then it grows at
the maximal feasible rate γ with no downsizing ever taking place; second, a maximal risk
prevention policy is implemented in which the agent always exerts effort.
From now on, we focus on the case where there is asymmetric information. Specifically,
we assume that, unlike profits and losses, the agent’s effort decisions are not observable by
the principal. This leads to a moral hazard problem, whose key parameters are B and ∆λ.
The larger the size-adjusted private benefit B is, the more attractive it is for the agent to
shirk. The lower ∆λ is, the more difficult it is to detect shirking. The contract between
the principal and the agent is designed and agreed upon at time 0. The agent reacts to this
contract by choosing an effort process Λ = {Λt}t≥0. We assume that the players can fully
commit to a long-term contract.
Remark We thus abstract throughout from imperfect commitment problems and focus on
a single source of market imperfection: moral hazard in risk prevention. This assumption
is standard in the dynamic moral hazard literature, see for instance Rogerson (1985), Spear
and Srivastava (1987) or Phelan and Townsend (1991). More precisely, our analysis is in
line with Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti,
Plantin and Rochet (2007), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, 2007b) or Sannikov (2008), where
limited liability reduces the ability to punish the agent. This compels the principal to replace
such punishments by actions, such as downsizing or liquidation, that are ex-post inefficient.13
When the principal is more patient than the agent and there is no investment, as in DeMarzo
and Sannikov (2006) and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet (2007), this leads to the result
that the firm eventually ceases to exist. By contrast, in the present model, this negative
trend can be outweighed by investment.
A contract specifies downsizing, investment and liquidation decisions, as well as payments
to the agent, as functions of the history of past losses. The size process X = {Xt}t≥0 is
positive, with initial condition X0 ≤ 1. The size of the project can be decomposed as:
(3) Xt = X0 +X
d
t +X
i
t
13For a discussion of renegotiation in this context, see Quadrini (2004), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006,
Section IV.B) or DeMarzo and Fishman (2007a, Appendix B2, 2007b, Section 2.9).
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for all t ≥ 0, where Xd = {Xdt }t≥0, the cumulative downsizing process, is decreasing, and
X i = {X it}t≥0, the cumulative investment process, is increasing. Our assumptions imply
that X i is absolutely continuous with respect to time, that is:
(4) X it =
∫ t
0
Xsgs ds,
where the instantaneous growth rate of the project satisfies
(5) 0 ≤ gt ≤ γ
for all t ≥ 0. Because of limited liability, the process L = {Lt}t≥0 describing the cumulative
transfers to the agent is positive and increasing. The time at which liquidation occurs is
denoted by τ . We allow τ to be infinite and we let Xt = 0 and Lt = Lτ for all t > τ .
At any time t prior to liquidation, the sequence of events during the infinitesimal time
interval [t, t+ dt] can heuristically be described as follows:
1. The size Xt of the project is determined, that is, there is downsizing, or investment,
or the size remains constant.
2. The agent takes her effort decision Λt.
3. With probability Λtdt, there is a loss, in which case dNt = 1; otherwise dNt = 0.
4. The agent receives a positive transfer dLt.
5. The project is either liquidated or continued.
According to this timing, the downsizing and effort decisions are taken before knowing the
current realization of the loss process. Formally, the processes X and Λ are FN–predictable,
where FN = {FNt }t≥0 is the filtration generated by N . By contrast, payment and liquidation
decisions at any time are taken after observing whether or not there was a loss at this time.
Hence L is FN–adapted and τ is an FN–stopping time.14 An effort process Λ generates
a unique probability distribution PΛ over the paths of the process N . Denote by EΛ the
corresponding expectation operator.
Given a contract Γ = (X,L, τ) and an effort process Λ, the expected discounted utility
of the agent is
(6) EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−ρt(dLt + 1{Λt=λ+∆λ}XtB dt)
]
,
14See for instance Dellacherie and Meyer (1978, Chapter IV, Definitions 12, 49 and 61) for definitions of
these concepts.
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while the expected discounted profit of the principal is15
(7) EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−rt{Xt[(µ− gtc)dt− CdNt]− dLt}
]
.
An effort process Λ is incentive compatible with respect to a contract Γ if it maximizes the
agent’s expected utility (6) given Γ. The problem of the principal is to find a contract Γ and
an incentive compatible effort process Λ that maximize its expected discounted profit (7),
subject to delivering to the agent a required expected discounted utility level. It is without
loss of generality to focus on contracts Γ such that the present value of the payments to the
agent is finite, that is:
(8) EΛ
[∫ τ
0
e−ρtdLt
]
<∞.
Indeed, by inspection of (7), if the present value of the payments to the agent were infinite,
the fact that ρ > r would imply infinitely negative expected discounted profits for the
principal. The latter would be better off proposing no contract altogether.
3 Incentive Compatibility and Limited Liability
To characterize incentive compatibility, we rely on martingale techniques similar to those
introduced by Sannikov (2008). When taking her effort decision at a time t, the agent
considers how it will affect her continuation utility, defined as:
(9) Wt(Γ,Λ) = E
Λ
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)(dLs + 1{Λs=λ+∆λ}XsBds) |FNt
]
1{t<τ}.
Denote by W (Γ,Λ) = {Wt(Γ,Λ)}t≥0 the agent’s continuation utility process. Note that,
by construction, W (Γ,Λ) is FN–adapted. In particular, Wt(Γ,Λ) reflects whether or not
there was a loss at time t. To characterize how the agent’s continuation utility evolves over
time, it is useful to consider her lifetime expected utility, evaluated conditionally upon the
information available at time t, that is:16
Ut(Γ,Λ) = E
Λ
[∫ τ
0
e−ρs(dLs + 1{Λs=λ+∆λ}XsBds) |FNt
]
(10)
=
∫ t∧τ−
0
e−ρs(dLs + 1{Λs=λ+∆λ}XsBds) + e
−ρtWt(Γ,Λ).
15All integrals are of the Lebesgue–Stieltjes kind. For each s and t, we write
∫ t
s
for
∫
[s,t]
and
∫ t−
s
for
∫
[s,t)
.
16For each x and y, we denote by x ∧ y the minimum of x and y, and by x ∨ y the maximum of x and y.
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Since Ut(Γ,Λ) is the expectation of a given random variable conditional on FNt , the process
U(Γ,Λ) = {Ut(Γ,Λ)}t≥0 is an FN–martingale under the probability measure PΛ. Its last
element is Uτ (Γ,Λ), which is integrable by (8).
Relying on this martingale property, we now offer an alternative representation of U(Γ,Λ).
Consider the process MΛ = {MΛt }t≥0 defined by
(11) MΛt = Nt −
∫ t
0
Λs ds
for all t ≥ 0. Equation (11) is best understood when Λ is a constant process. In that case,
MΛt is simply the number of losses up to and including time t, minus its expectation. More
generally, a basic result from the theory of point processes is that MΛ is an FN–martingale
under PΛ. Changes in the effort process Λ induce changes in the distribution of losses,
which essentially amount to Girsanov transformations of the process N . The martingale
representation theorem for point processes then implies the following lemma.17
Lemma 1 The martingale U(Γ,Λ) satisfies
(12) Ut(Γ,Λ) = U0(Γ,Λ)−
∫ t∧τ
0
e−ρsHs(Γ,Λ) dMΛs
for all t ≥ 0, PΛ–almost surely, for some FN–predictable process H(Γ,Λ) = {Ht(Γ,Λ)}t≥0.
Along with (11), (12) implies that the lifetime expected utility of the agent evolves in
response to the jumps of the process N . At any time t, the change in Ut(Γ,Λ) is equal to the
product between a FN–predictable function of the past, namely e−ρtHt(Γ,Λ), and a term
−dMΛt reflecting the events occurring at time t. This term is in turn equal to the difference
between the instantaneous probability Λtdt of a loss, and the instantaneous change dNt in
the total number of losses, which is equal to 0 or 1. Equations (10) and (12) imply that the
continuation utility of the agent evolves as:
(13) dWt(Γ,Λ) = [ρWt(Γ,Λ)− 1{Λt=λ+∆λ}XtB]dt+Ht(Γ,Λ)(Λtdt− dNt)− dLt
for all t ∈ [0, τ). Equation (13) states that, net of private benefits and wages, the expected
instantaneous change in the continuation utility of the agent is equal to her discount rate ρ,
while H(Γ,Λ) is the sensitivity to losses of this utility. Building on this analysis, and letting
b = B/∆λ, we obtain the following result, in line with Sannikov (2008, Proposition 2).
17See for instance Bre´maud (1981, Chapter III, Theorems T9 and T17, and Chapter VI, Theorems T2
and T3) for the relevant results.
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Proposition 1 A necessary and sufficient condition for the effort process Λ to be incentive
compatible given the contract Γ = (X,L, τ) is that
(14) Λt = λ if and only if Ht(Γ,Λ) ≥ Xtb
for all t ∈ [0, τ), PΛ–almost surely.
It follows from (13) that, if there is a loss at some time t ∈ [0, τ), the agent’s continuation
utility must be instantaneously reduced by an amount Ht(Γ,Λ).
18 Proposition 1 states that,
in order to induce the agent to choose a high level of risk prevention, this reduction in
her continuation utility must be at least as large as Xtb. This is because Xtb reflects the
attractiveness of the private benefits obtained by the agent when shirking. To reason in
size-adjusted terms, let ht = Ht/Xt. The incentive compatibility condition (14) under which
Λt = λ then rewrites as:
(15) ht ≥ b.
It is convenient to introduce the notation Wt−(Γ,Λ) = lims↑tWs(Γ,Λ) to denote the left-
hand limit of the process W (Γ,Λ) at t > 0. While Wt(Γ,Λ) is the continuation utility of
the agent at time t after observing whether or not there was a loss at time t, Wt−(Γ,Λ) is
the continuation utility of the agent evaluated before such knowledge is obtained.19 Observe
that, while the process W (Γ,Λ) is FN–adapted, the process W·−(Γ,Λ) = {Wt−(Γ,Λ)}t≥0 is
FN–predictable. Combining the fact that the continuation utility of the agent must remain
positive according to the limited liability constraint, with the fact that it must be reduced
by an amount Ht(Γ,Λ) if there is a loss at time t according to (13), one must have
(16) Wt−(Γ,Λ) ≥ Ht(Γ,Λ)
for all t ∈ [0, τ). To simplify notation, we shall drop the arguments Γ and Λ in the remainder
of the paper.
4 Optimal Contracting with Maximal Risk Prevention
While in the previous section we considered general effort processes, in the present section
we characterize the optimal contract that induces maximal risk prevention, that is Λt = λ
18In full generality, one should also allow for jumps in the transfer process. For incentive reasons, it is
however never optimal to pay the agent when a loss occurs. Moreover, it will turn out that the optimal
transfer process is absolutely continuous, so that payments do not come in lump-sums. To ease the exposition,
we therefore rule out jumps in the transfer process in the body of the paper. The possibility of such jumps
is explicitly taken into account below in the verification theorem.
19W0−(Γ,Λ) is defined by (6).
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for all t ∈ [0, τ). This is in line with most of the literature on the principal-agent model,
which offers more precise insights into how to implement given courses of actions at minimal
cost than into which course of actions is, all things considered, optimal for the principal.20
In Section 6.1, however, we shall provide sufficient conditions under which it is optimal for
the principal to request maximal risk prevention from the agent. The optimal contract that
we derive in this section can be described with the help of two state variables: the size of
the project, resulting from past downsizing and investment decisions, and the continuation
utility of the agent, reflecting future payment decisions. To build intuition, we first provide a
heuristic derivation of the principal’s value function and of the main features of the optimal
contract. Next, we verify that this candidate value function is indeed optimal, and we fully
characterize the optimal contract.
4.1 A Heuristic Derivation
In this heuristic derivation, we suppose that transfers are absolutely continuous with respect
to time, and that no payment is made after a loss, that is:
(17) dLt = Xt`t1{dNt=0}dt
where
(18) `t ≥ 0
for all t ≥ 0. Here {`t}t≥0, is assumed to be an FN–predictable process representing the
size-adjusted transfer flow to the agent. We will later verify that this conjecture is correct at
the optimal contract. Now consider project size. Downsizing is suboptimal in the first-best,
and, as we will later verify, it remains so in the second-best as long as no losses occur. After
losses, however, downsizing may prove necessary in the second-best. This reflects that, for
incentive purposes, it is necessary to reduce the agent’s continuation utility after each loss
by an amount that is proportional to her private benefits from shirking. The latter, in turn,
are proportional to the size of the project. When the continuation utility of the agent is low,
the incentive compatibility constraint is compatible with the limited liability constraint only
if the size of the project is itself low enough.
To see this more precisely, suppose that, at the outset of time t, the size of the project is
Xt and the continuation utility of the agent is Wt− . If there is a loss at time t, the agent’s
continuation utility must be reduced from Wt− to Wt = Wt− − Xtht. At this point, the
20See for instance Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapters 4 and 8) for a recent overview of that literature.
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question arises whether this loss implies that the project should be downsized. Denote by
Xt+ = lims↓tXs ∈ [0, Xt] the size of the project just after time t. Since effort is still required
from the agent, Proposition 1 implies that, if there were a second loss, arbitrarily close to the
first, the continuation utility of the agent would have to be reduced further by at least Xt+b.
This would be consistent with limited liability only if Wt− −Xtht ≥ Xt+b, or, equivalently,
letting wt = Wt−/Xt and xt = Xt+/Xt, if
(19)
wt − ht
b
≥ xt.
Hence, downsizing is necessary after the first loss, that is xt < 1, whenever the initial size-
adjusted continuation utility wt of the agent is so low that (wt − ht)/b < 1.
We are now ready to characterize the evolution of the continuation value F (Xt,Wt−) of
the principal. Since the principal discounts the future at rate r, his expected flow of value
at time t is given by
(20) rF (Xt,Wt−).
This must be equal to the sum of the expected instantaneous cash-flows and of the expected
rate of change in his continuation value. The former are equal to the expected net cash-flow
from the project, minus the cost of investment and the expected payment to the agent. By
(4) and (17), this yields
(21) Xt[µ− λC − gtc− `t(1− λdt)].
To evaluate the expected rate of change in the principal’s continuation value, we use the
dynamics (3) of the project’s size along with that of the agent’s continuation utility, setting
Λt = λ in (13). Applying the change of variable formula for processes of bounded variation,
which is the counterpart of Itoˆ’s formula for these processes, this yields21
(22)
[ρWt− +Xt(λht − `t)]FW (Xt,Wt−) +XtgtFX(Xt,Wt−)
−λ[F (Xt,Wt−)− F (Xtxt,Wt− −Xtht)].
The first term arises because of the drift of W·− , the second corresponds to investment, and
the third reflects the possibility of jumps in the project’s size and in the agent’s continuation
utility due to losses. Adding (22) to (21), identifying to (20), and letting dt go to 0, we obtain
21See for instance Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, Chapter VI, Section 92).
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that the value function of the principal satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation
(23)
rF (Xt,Wt−) = Xt(µ− λC) + max {−Xt`t + [ρWt− +Xt(λht − `t)]FW (Xt,Wt−)
+Xtgt[FX(Xt,Wt−)− c]
−λ[F (Xt,Wt−)− F (Xtxt,Wt− −Xtht)]},
where the maximization in (23) is over the set of controls (gt, ht, `t, xt) that satisfy constraints
(5), (15), (18) and (19).
To get more insight into the structure of the solution, we impose further restrictions on
the function F , that we will later check to be satisfied at the optimal contract. First, because
of constant returns to scale, it is natural to require F to be homogenous of degree 1,
F (X,W ) = XF
(
1,
W
X
)
= Xf
(
W
X
)
for all (X,W ) ∈ R++ × R+. Intuitively, f maps the size-adjusted continuation utility wt of
the agent into the size-adjusted continuation value of the principal. Second, we require f
to be globally concave. This property, which will be formally established in the verification
theorem below, has the following economic interpretation. As argued above, while downsizing
is inefficient in the first-best, it is necessary in the second-best to provide incentives to the
agent when wt is low. When this is the case, the principal’s value reacts strongly to bad
performance because the latter significantly raises the risk of costly downsizing. By contrast,
when wt is large, bad performance has a more limited impact on downsizing risk. This greater
sensitivity to shocks when wt is low than when it is large is reflected in the concavity of the
size-adjusted value function f . Finally, we set
f(w) =
f(b)
b
w
for all w ∈ [0, b]. This is just by convention, and to simplify the notation, since, by (14) and
(16), wt never enters the interval [0, b).
We can now derive several properties of the optimal controls in the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman equation. Optimizing with respect to `t and using the homogeneity of F yields
(24) f ′(wt) = FW (Xt,Wt−) ≥ −1,
with equality only if `t > 0. Intuitively, the left-hand side of (24) is the increase in the
principal’s continuation value due to a marginal increase in the agent’s continuation utility,
while the right-hand side is the marginal cost to the principal of making an immediate
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payment to the agent. It is optimal to delay payments as long as they are more costly than
utility promises, that is, as long as the inequality in (24) is strict. The concavity of f implies
that this is the case when wt is below a given threshold, which we denote by w
p. The optimal
contract thus satisfies the following property.
Property 1 Payments to the agent are made only if her size-adjusted continuation utility
is at least wp. The payment threshold wp satisfies
(25) f ′(wp) = −1.
In the first-best, all the payments to the agent would be made at time 0, as she is more
impatient than the principal. By contrast, in the second-best, payments must be delayed
and made contingent to a long enough record of good performance, in order to provide
incentives to the agent. Since f is concave, it follows from (24) and (25) that f ′(w) = −1
for all w ≥ wp. If one were to start from that region, the optimal contract would entail the
immediate payment of a lump-sum w − wp to the agent, counterbalanced by a drop of her
size-adjusted continuation utility to wp.
Suppose that wt is below the threshold w
p, implying that `t = 0. Then, using the
homogeneity of F , one can rewrite (23) as follows:
(26)
rf(wt) = µ− λC +max
{
(ρwt + λht)f
′(wt) + gt[f(wt)− wtf ′(wt)− c]
−λ
[
f(wt)− xtf
(
wt − ht
xt
)]}
.
Since f is concave and vanishes at 0, the mapping xt 7→ xtf((wt − ht)/xt) is increasing. It
is thus optimal to let xt be as high as possible in (26), reflecting that downsizing is costly
since the project is profitable. Using (19) along with the fact that xt ≤ 1 then leads to the
second property of the optimal contract.
Property 2 If there is a loss at time t, the optimal downsizing policy is
(27) xt =
wt − ht
b
∧ 1.
This property of the optimal contract reflects that, for a given level of incentives as
measured by ht, downsizing is imposed only as the last resort. Using our convention that f
is linear over [0, b], one can substitute (27) into (26) to obtain
(28)
rf(wt) = µ− λC +max {(ρwt + λht)f ′(wt) + gt[f(wt)− wtf ′(wt)− c]
−λ[f(wt)− f(wt − ht)]}.
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The concavity of f implies that it is optimal to let ht be as low as possible in (28), which
according to the incentive compatibility condition (15) leads to the third property of the
optimal contract.
Property 3 The sensitivity to losses of the agent’s continuation utility is given by
(29) ht = b.
Intuitively, (29) reflects that because the principal’s continuation value is concave in the
agent’s continuation utility, it is optimal to reduce the agent’s exposure to risk by letting ht
equal the minimal value consistent with her exerting effort. In particular, downsizing takes
place following a loss at date t if and only if wt < 2b, that is, if and only if it is absolutely
necessary in order to maintain the consistency between the incentive compatibility constraint
and the limited liability constraint.
Finally turn to investment decisions. Note that the size-adjusted social value of the
project, f(w)+w, is increasing in w until wp and flat afterwards. A necessary and sufficient
condition for investment to ever be strictly profitable is that the maximal size-adjusted social
value of the project be larger than the unit cost of investment:
(30) f(wp) + wp > c.
If (30) did not hold, the value of investment would be lower than its cost, so that it would
be suboptimal to invest.22 Thus, as will be checked below in the verification theorem, there
is some investment in the optimal contract only if c is not too high. Optimizing in (28) with
respect to gt under constraint (5), we obtain that gt = γ if
(31) f(wt)− wtf ′(wt) > c,
and gt = 0 otherwise. The left-hand side of (31) is the marginal benefit of an additional
capacity unit, while the right-hand side is the unit cost of investment. Scale expansion is
optimal when the former is greater than the latter. In that case, because of the linearity in
the technology, size grows at the maximal feasible rate γ. The concavity of f implies that
(31) holds when wt is above a given threshold, which we denote by w
i. The optimal contract
thus satisfies the following property.
22If (30) held as an equality, whether or not investment take place would be indifferent from a social
viewpoint. Since, fixing the other parameters of the model, this can only occur for a single value of c, we
shall ignore that possibility in the remainder of the paper.
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Property 4 Investment takes place, at rate γ, if and only if the size-adjusted continuation
utility of the agent is above wi. The investment threshold wi satisfies
(32) wi = inf {w > b |f(w)− wf ′(w) > c}.
In the first-best, because of condition (1), investment always takes place at the maximal
rate γ. By contrast, in the second-best, if c is not too low, this is the case only if a long
enough record of good performance has been accumulated. This is because increasing the
size of the project raises the private benefits from shirking and thus worsens the moral hazard
problem. This jeopardizes incentives, except if the agent has enough at stake to still prefer
high effort, that is, only if wt is large enough. An important alternative scenario arises
whenever c is low enough. In that case, inequality (31) is satisfied for all wt > b, so that
wi = b and it is always optimal to invest, even in the second-best. Formally, this is reflected
in the fact that the function f is not differentiable at b, with f ′−(b) = f(b)/b > f
′
+(b), so that
f(b)− bf ′+(b) > c for c close enough to 0.
The dynamics of the principal’s size-adjusted continuation value depends on whether or
not there is investment. In the no investment region (b, wi], one has
(33) rf = µ− λC + Lf,
where the delay differential operator L is defined by
(34) Lf(w) = (ρw + λb)f ′(w)− λ[f(w)− f(w − b)].
In the investment region (wi, wp], one has
(35) (r − γ)f = µ− λC − γc+ Lγf,
where the delay differential operator Lγ is defined by
(36) Lγf(w) = [(ρ− γ)w + λb]f ′(w)− λ[f(w)− f(w − b)].
Comparing equations (35) and (36) to equations (33) and (34) reveals that, besides the
decrease γc in the size-adjusted cash-flow, the impact of investment at rate γ is comparable
to that of a decrease γ in both the principal’s and the agent’s discount rates. Intuitively,
this reflects that investment makes delaying payments less costly, because the total size of
the pie grows while the players wait. Thus, although incentive considerations imply that
both investment and payments should be delayed relative to the first-best, investment takes
place before payments do, as stated now.
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Property 5 If investment is strictly profitable, the investment threshold wi is strictly lower
than the payment threshold wp.
This follows from evaluating (31) at wp, which yields f(wp) − wpf ′(wp) > c because of
(25) and (30). While investment takes place in a region where the size-adjusted social value
of the project is strictly increasing, payments are made to the agent when the size-adjusted
social value of the project reaches its maximum, so that it is inefficient to delay payments
any longer. At the payment threshold wp, transfers are constructed in such a way that the
agent’s continuation utility stays constant until there is a loss. That is, they are set to
the highest level consistent with the size-adjusted social value remaining at its maximum.
This level can be computed as follows. Setting Λt = λ in (13) and making use of (17) and
Property 3, we obtain that
(37) dWt = (ρWt +Xtλb)dt−XtbdNt −Xt`t1{dNt=0}dt.
Suppose now that wt = w
p, so that the size-adjusted social value of the project is at its
maximum, and that dNt = 0, so that there is no loss at time t. Then Wt = Xtw
p and
dXt = Xtγdt. Substituting in (37), we obtain the following property.
Property 6 If there is no loss at time t, the size-adjusted transfer flow is
(38) `t = [(ρ− γ)wp + λb]1{wt=wp}.
According to (38), when payments are made at the payment threshold wp, they come in
a steady flow in size-adjusted terms until a loss occurs.
The above conjectures about the structure of the optimal contract are illustrated on
Figure 1.
—Insert Figure 1 Here—
Because of constant returns to scale, there are four regimes in the (Xt,Wt−)–plane separated
by straight lines, reflecting that downsizing, investment or transfers take place depending on
the position of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility relative to the thresholds b, wi
and wp. Because b ≤ wt ≤ wp for all t > 0, (Xt,Wt−) stays away from the interiors of the
downsizing and transfer regions after time 0.
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4.2 The Verification Theorem
We now show that the above heuristic characterization does correspond to the optimal
contract. To do this, we first show that there exists a size-adjusted value function f such
that Properties 1 to 6 hold.
Proposition 2 Suppose that
(39) µ− λC > (ρ− r)b
(
2 +
r
λ
)
.
Then there exists a constant c > 0 such that if
(40) c < c,
the delay differential equation
(41)

f(w) = f(b)
b
w if w ∈ [0, b],
rf(w) = µ− λC + Lf(w) if w ∈ (b, wi],
(r − γ)f(w) = µ− λC − γc+ Lγf(w) if w ∈ (wi, wp],
f(w) = f(wp) + wp − w if w ∈ (wp,∞)
has a maximal solution f, where the thresholds wp and wi are endogenously determined by
(25) and (32), with wp > wi, and the operators L and Lγ are defined as in (34) and (36).
The function f is globally concave and continuously differentiable except at b.
If condition (39) did not hold, the solution would be degenerate, with downsizing taking
place after each loss. This would arise because the private benefits from shirking would
be large relative to the expected cash-flow from the project, making the agency problem
very severe. Condition (40) ensures that the investment cost is low enough so that there
are circumstances in which it is strictly optimal to increase the size of the project. If the
investment cost c were strictly larger than c, the optimal contract would be similar to that
described above, except that the investment region would be empty. The threshold value c
corresponds to the maximum of the size-adjusted social value of the project arising in this
no investment situation.
The next step of the analysis is to show that the function constructed in Proposition 2
yields the maximal value that can be obtained by the principal, and to explicitly construct
21
the optimal contract. To do so, fix an initial project size X0 and an initial expected utility
W0− for the agent, and consider the processes {wt}t≥0 and {lt}t≥0 solutions to
wt = w0 +
∫ t−
0
{
[(ρ− γ1{ws>wi})ws + λb] ds− b
(
ws − b
b
∧ 1
)
dNs − dls
}
,(42)
lt = (w0 − wp) ∨ 0 +
∫ t
0
[(ρ− γ)wp + λb]1{ws+=wp} ds(43)
for all t ≥ 0, where w0 = W0−/X0, and wi and wp are defined as in Proposition 2. For
the moment, we simply take these processes as given. Yet, consistent with the heuristic
derivation of Section 4.1, it will eventually turn out in equilibrium that, at any time t, wt
is the initial size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent, while lt represents cumulative
size-adjusted transfers up to and including time t. The following proposition is central to
our results.
Proposition 3 Under conditions (39) and (40), the optimal contract Γ = (X,L, τ) that
induces maximal risk prevention and delivers the agent an initial expected discounted utility
W0− given initial firm size X0 is as follows:
(i) The project is downsized by a factor [(wTk − b)/b] ∧ 1 at any time Tk at which there is
a loss. Moreover, the size of the project grows at rate γ as long as wt > w
i, and at rate
0 otherwise. As a result, the size of the project is
(44) Xt = X0
Nt−∏
k=1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(∫ t
0
γ1{ws>wi} ds
)
at any time t ≥ 0.23
(ii) The flow of transfers to the agent is Xt[(ρ− γ)wp+λb] as long as wt = wp and no loss
occurs. As a result, the cumulative transfers to the agent are
(45) Lt = X0l0 +
∫ t
0
Xs dls
at any time t ≥ 0.24
(iii) Liquidation occurs with probability 0 on the equilibrium path:
(46) τ =∞,
P–almost surely.
23By convention,
∏
∅ = 1.
24Observe from (42) and (43) that wt+ = wp if and only if wt = wp and there is no loss at time t.
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The value to the principal of this contract is F (X0,W0−) = X0f(W0−/X0), with f constructed
as in Proposition 2.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the optimal contract entails at any time t a
continuation utility Wt = lims↓tXsws for the agent. The process W obtained in this way
satisfies (13) with Λt = λ and Ht = Xtb, and thus induces maximal risk prevention. As
conjectured in Section 4.1, the optimal contract involves two state variables, the size of the
project, Xt, and the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent, wt, or, equivalently, her
beginning-of-period continuation utility Wt− = Xtwt.
The main features of the optimal contract are also in line with the heuristic derivation
of Properties 1 to 6. First consider transfers, as given by (43) and (45). If w0 > w
p, an
initial lump-sum is immediately distributed to the agent. Then, at time t > 0, transfers take
place if and only if wt = w
p and there is no loss, and they are constructed in such a way
that the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility stays constant until a loss occurs. This is
consistent with Properties 1 and 6.
Next consider the size of the project, as given by (44). The first term on the right-hand
side of (44) is the initial size of the firm. The second term on the right-hand side of (44)
reflects downsizing, which takes place only after losses occur at the random times Tk and
when (wTk − b)/b < 1. This is consistent with Properties 2 and 3. The third term on the
right-hand side of (44) reflects that investment takes place, at rate γ, if and only if wt > w
i.
This is consistent with Properties 4 and 5.
Finally consider the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent, as given by (42). Its
dynamics is somewhat complicated, as it reflects the joint effect of direct changes in the
agent’s continuation utility and indirect changes due to the variations in the project’s size.
It follows from (42) that, if a loss occurs at a time Tk such that wTk ≥ 2b, no downsizing takes
place, and the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent drops by an amount b. This is
consistent with Property 3. By contrast, if a loss occurs at a time Tk such that b ≤ wTk < 2b,
the project is downsized by a factor (wTk − b)/b, and the size-adjusted continuation utility
of the agent drops by an amount wTk − b. Thus, in any case, the sensitivity to losses of the
agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility is (wTk − b) ∧ b.
It should be emphasized that liquidation plays virtually no role in the optimal incentive
contract, as reflected by (46). Indeed, as can be seen from (42), wt = Wt−/Xt always remains
strictly greater than b. As a result, Wt, which is in the worst case equal to Wt− − Xtb if
there is a loss at time t, always remains strictly positive.25 This is in sharp contrast with
25Exceptions arise only with probability 0, for instance if W0− = X0b and there is a loss at time 0.
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the Brownian models studied by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin
and Rochet (2007) and Sannikov (2008), in which the optimal contract relies crucially on
liquidation and involves no downsizing. Admittedly, even in the context of our Poisson
model, an alternative way to provide incentives to the agent in case of bad performance
would be to threaten her to randomly liquidating the project, as is customary in discrete-
time models (see for instance Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) or DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007b)). But in contrast with what happens in Brownian models, liquidation would then
necessarily have to be both stochastic (as it would depend on the realization of a lottery at
each potential liquidation time) and unpredictable (as it would take place only after a loss).
When modeled in this way, liquidation allows the principal to achieve the same value as
under downsizing. This would however be less tractable analytically, and less conducive to
a realistic implementation of the optimal contract. Besides, and more importantly, allowing
for downsizing gives rise to a richer dynamics for the size of the project, which can increase
but also decrease over time following good or bad performance.
Proposition 3 describes the optimal contract for a given initial project size X0 and a
given initial expected discounted utility W0− for the agent. In Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and
Villeneuve (2009, Section D.3), we examine how these are determined at time 0 whenever
the principal is competitive. That is, we look for a pair (X0,W0−) that maximizes utilitarian
welfare under the constraint that the principal breaks even on average. As soon as f takes
strictly positive values, it is optimal to start operating the project at full scale, X0 = 1.
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When the participation constraint of the principal is slack, the contract is initiated at the
payment threshold w0 = w
p, so that the agent is immediately compensated. By contrast,
when the participation constraint of the principal binds, it is necessary to initiate the contract
at a lower level w0 < w
p, so that it is optimal to wait before compensating the agent.
5 Firm Size Dynamics
In this section, we build on the above analysis to study size dynamics under maximal risk
prevention. Because of downsizing and investment, the scale of operations varies over time
in the optimal contract. These variations can be interpreted as the dynamics of firm size.
Our model generates a rich variety of possible paths for such dynamics. Over its life cycle,
the firm can grow, stagnate or decline.
To illustrate this point, consider the following typical path, depicted on Figure 2.
26Otherwise it is optimal to let X0 =W0− = 0 and not to operate the project.
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—Insert Figure 2 Here—
Firm size starts at the level X0. As long as there is no loss, the size-adjusted continuation
utility of the agent rises, and eventually reaches the investment threshold wi. From this
point on, investment takes place at rate γ and the firm grows. However, if a loss occurs
at time Tk, the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent drops from wTk to wT+k
=
(wTk − b) ∨ b. If this lower utility level is below wi, investment stops and firm size remains
constant. Furthermore, if wT+k
< 2b and there is another loss shortly afterwards, downsizing
is necessary. The corresponding path in the (Xt,Wt−)–plane is depicted on Figure 3.
—Insert Figure 3 Here—
While, in the short-run, firm size can grow, stagnate or decline, it is unclear how it is likely
to behave in the long run. Will downsizing bring it down to 0? Or will the firm grow
indefinitely thanks to investment? To address this issue, we study the limit as t goes to
∞ of the average growth rate of the firm until time t. For simplicity set X0 to 1. Then
Proposition 3 implies that this average growth rate is equal to
(47)
ln(Xt)
t
=
1
t
[ Nt−∑
k=1
ln
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
+
∫ t
0
γ1{ws>wi} ds
]
.
Now, let µw be the unique invariant measure associated to the process {wTk}k≥1 of the
agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility just before losses, let µw+ be the unique invariant
measure associated to the process {wT+k }k≥1 of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility
just after losses, and let λ be the exponential distribution with parameter λ. Then, using an
appropriate law of large numbers for Markov ergodic processes, one can derive the following
result.27
Proposition 4 Under conditions (39) and (40), the long-run growth rate of the firm is
lim
t→∞
ln(Xt)
t
= λ
∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw)
(48)
+ γ
[
1− λ
∫
[b,wi)×R+
(tw,wi ∧ s) µw+⊗λ(dw, ds)
]
,
P–almost surely, where
tw,wi =
1
ρ
ln
(
ρwi + λb
ρw + λb
)
27See for instance Stout (1974, Theorem 3.6.7).
25
is the time it takes for the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility to reach wi when starting
from w ∈ [b, wi), if there are no losses in the meanwhile.
The first term of the right-hand size of (48) reflects the impact of downsizing. Downsizing
takes place when losses occur, which is more likely if the intensity λ of the loss process N
is high, and when the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent lies in the region [b, 2b)
where downsizing cannot be avoided whenever a loss occurs.
The second term of the right-hand size of (48) reflects the impact of investment. The
latter takes place, at rate γ, when the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent is above
the investment threshold wi. The term within brackets multiplying γ on the right-hand
side of (48) is the frequency with which the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent is
above wi. To build intuition about this term, consider the time interval (Tk, Tk+1] between
two consecutive losses. There is no investment during this time interval as long as the size-
adjusted continuation utility of the agent stays below wi. The probability of that event
depends on the value of the continuation utility of the agent at the beginning of the time
interval, wT+k
, as well as on the length Tk+1 − Tk of this time interval. This is why there
is a double integral in (48), with respect to the invariant measures µw+ and λ of these
two independent random variables. The interpretation of the term in parentheses inside the
double integral is that there is no investment during (Tk, Tk+1] if Tk+1 − Tk < tw
T+
k
,wi , that
is, if a loss occurs before the size-adjusted continuation utility of the agent had the time to
reach wi starting from wT+k
< wi.
To gain more insights into the long-run behavior of the size of the firm, consider for
tractability the case where c is small, so that
(49) f(b)− bf ′+(b) ≥ c.
In that case, the optimal contract stipulates that investment should continuously take place
at rate γ, and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Under conditions (39), (40) and (49), if γ is close to 0, then
(50) lim
t→∞
Xt = 0,
P–almost surely, while if γ > λ2/(ρ− γ + λ), then
(51) lim
t→∞
Xt =∞,
P–almost surely.
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First consider (50). In that case, the maximal feasible growth rate γ of the firm is low,
so that the impact of investment is negligible. Now, to maintain incentive compatibility and
limited liability, downsizing must take place when losses occur and the agent’s size-adjusted
continuation utility is close to its lower bound b. Because the stochastic process describing
the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility is Markov ergodic over [b, wp], this situation
will prevail an infinite number of times with probability 1. As a result, the size of the firm
and the continuation utility of the agent must eventually go to 0.
Next consider (51). In that case, the frequency λ of losses is low relative to the maximal
feasible growth rate γ of the firm, so that the positive effect of investment dominates the
negative effect of downsizing. Thus, in the long run, the firm becomes infinitely large. Note
however that, even in this case, the long-run growth rate of the firm remains strictly lower
than in the first-best, because of downsizing.
These two asymptotic results differ from the classic immiseration result of Thomas and
Worrall (1990). In their model, the agent’s continuation utility eventually diverges to −∞.
But the reason why this outcome obtains differs from the reason why, in our model, firm
size goes to 0 when γ is low. Indeed, in Thomas and Worrall (1990), the period utility
function of the agent is concave and unbounded below. Consequently, providing incentives
is cheaper, the lower the agent’s continuation utility is. This reflects the fact that the cost of
obtaining a given spread in the agent’s continuation utility is then lower. The principal thus
has an incentive to let the agent’s utility drift to −∞. By contrast, in our model, the cost
of incentive compatibility is high when the agent’s continuation utility is low. This reflects
the fact that limited liability makes it then more difficult to induce large variations in the
agent’s continuation utility. Yet, firm size can go to 0 if γ is low relative to λ, so that the
effect of downsizing overcomes that of investment. If γ is high relative to λ, firm size goes to
infinity. Now, the continuation utility of the agent is equal to her size-adjusted continuation
utility, which by construction lives in [b, wp], multiplied by firm size. Hence in that case the
continuation utility of the agent grows unboundedly, which is exactly the opposite of the
immiseration result.
Proposition 5 provides parameter restrictions under which firm size Xt unambiguously
goes to 0 or ∞ with probability 1 when t goes to ∞. More generally, for all parameter
values, including those under which (49) does not hold, the following holds.
Proposition 6 Under conditions (39) and (40), each of the events {limt→∞Xt = 0} and
{limt→∞Xt =∞} has either a probability 0 or 1 of occurring.
The intuition for this result is twofold. First, as can be seen from (44), the events that
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firm size Xt goes to 0 or to ∞ are tail events. That is, whether or not they occur depends
on what happens in the long run, and not on what happens over any finite horizon. Second,
the stochastic processes that drive the evolution of firm size satisfy a mixing property, which
implies that tail events have either probability 0 or 1. Note that Proposition 6 does not assert
that one of the events {limt→∞Xt = 0} and {limt→∞Xt =∞} must occur with probability
1: both of them may have probability 0. What it rules out, for instance, is a scenario in
which, with probability p, the size of the firm eventually vanishes, while with probability
1− p it eventually explodes, for some p ∈ (0, 1).
This asymptotic result sharply differs from that arising in Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006). In their long-run analysis, either the firm is eventually liquidated, or the first-best
is eventually attained and the firm is never liquidated. Each of these absorbing outcomes
has a strictly positive probability in the stationary distribution. This difference with our
results stems from the fact that, in their model, the principal and the agent have identical
discount rates, while in ours the agent is more impatient than the principal.28 In Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006), because the principal and the agent are equally patient, it is costless
to delay the agent’s consumption while capitalizing it at the common discount rate. Hence,
it is optimal to try and accumulate pledges to the agent until her savings are so high that she
can buy the firm and implement the first-best policy. With some probability, the agent is
lucky enough that such high performance is achieved and the first-best is attained. With the
complementary probability, the agent is not as lucky, and liquidation eventually occurs. By
contrast, in our model, delaying consumption is costly, since the agent is more impatient than
the principal. It is therefore optimal to let her consume before the first-best is attained. This
reduces the growth in the accumulated pledge to the agent, which, in turn, raises the risk
of downsizing. Whenever the maximal investment rate is low, such downsizing eventually
brings firm size to 0 with probability 1. Whenever the maximal investment rate is high, firm
size tends to grow so fast that it eventually explodes in spite of downsizing. Note however
that, in that case, the first-best is not attained, even in the long run, because moral hazard
still slows down the rate at which the firm grows.
28In Clementi and Hopenhayn’s (2006) discrete-time model, unlike in our continuous-time model, identical
discount rates for the principal and the agent do not preclude the existence of an optimal contract. A further
difference is that they assume that capital fully depreciates from one period to the next, while there is no
capital depreciation in our model.
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6 Robustness
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results. We first provide sufficient conditions
for the optimality of maximal risk prevention. Then, we briefly examine the case of non
constant returns to scale.
6.1 Optimality of Maximal Risk Prevention
So far, our analysis has focused on the optimal contract under maximal risk prevention. We
now investigate under which circumstances it is actually optimal for the principal to require
such a high level of effort from the agent. For simplicity, we conduct this analysis in the case
where there is no investment, that is γ = 0.
Note that the contract characterized in Proposition 3 depends on B and ∆λ only through
their ratio b = B/∆λ. Hence there is one degree of freedom in the parameters of the model,
as one can scale B and ∆λ up or down while keeping b constant, leaving the optimal contract
under maximal risk prevention unaffected. Intuition suggests that when ∆λ gets large, it is
optimal to prevent losses as much as possible. To see why, observe that if a contract induced
shirking during some infinitesimal time interval [t, t + dt), the agent’s continuation utility
would not need to be affected were a loss to occur at time t. That is, one should have Ht = 0
in (13). Since it is optimal to make no transfers over [t, t+ dt) as the agent is shirking, (13)
then implies that this would result in a change
(52) dwt = (ρwt −B)dt
in the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility. To determine whether requiring the agent
to always exert effort is optimal, we compare the continuation value of the principal under
maximal risk prevention to its counterpart when the agent shirks during [t, t+ dt) and then
reverts to exerting effort. The former is greater than the latter if
(53) f(wt) ≥ [µ− (λ+∆λ)C]dt+ e−rdtf(wt + dwt),
where dwt is given by (52). The first term on the right-hand side of (53) reflects the increased
intensity of losses over [t, t + dt) due to shirking, while the second term corresponds to the
continuation value to the principal from requesting maximal risk prevention from time t+dt
on. Given (52), a first-order Taylor expansion in (53) leads to
(54) rf(wt) ≥ µ− (λ+∆λ)C + (ρwt −B)f ′(wt).
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Unlike in (33), there is no delay term on the right-hand side of (54), because the agent’s
continuation utility is not sensitive to losses during the time interval [t, t+dt). Maximal risk
prevention is optimal if (54) holds for any value of wt > b. One has the following result.
Proposition 7 Suppose that γ = 0, and fix all the parameters of the model except B and
∆λ, for which only the ratio b = B/∆λ is fixed, so that an increase in B is compensated by
a proportional increase in ∆λ. Then there exists a threshold ∆λ > 0 such that the optimal
contract involves maximal risk prevention for all ∆λ > ∆λ.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Both B and ∆λ affect the magnitude of the
moral hazard problem and therefore the cost of incentives. However, under maximal risk
prevention, they do so only via their ratio b; formally, this is reflected in the fact that
the function f depends on B and ∆λ only through b. Now, while an increase in ∆λ makes
shirking easier to detect, and raises the value to the principal of a high level of risk prevention
effort, an increase in B leaves this value unaffected. Hence, when one keeps b and thus the
cost of incentives constant, increasing ∆λ raises the benefit of effort for the principal without
affecting its cost. As a result, when ∆λ is sufficiently high, it is optimal for the principal to
require the agent to always exert effort.
6.2 Non Constant Returns to Scale
Our analysis relies on the assumption that there are constant returns to scale. What can be
said when one relaxes this assumption? Suppose for instance that the private benefits from
shirking are equal to some increasing function B(X) of firm size X, and, for simplicity, keep
all our other assumptions unchanged. Incentive compatibility conditions are basically the
same in that extension. The continuation utility of the agent writes as:
Wt(Γ,Λ) = E
Λ
[∫ τ
t
e−ρ(s−t)[dLs + 1{Λs=λ+∆λ}B(Xs)ds] |FNt
]
1{t<τ},
and the underlying martingale is still MΛ, so that the martingale representation theorem
applies and Lemma 1 continues to hold. Similarly, Proposition 1 is essentially unchanged,
except that the incentive compatibility condition under which the agent exerts effort is now
Ht(Γ,Λ) ≥ B(Xt)
∆λ
.
Suppose now that the principal wants to implement maximal risk prevention. Then, like
when returns to scale are constant, it will be necessary to downsize the project after a loss
if the agent’s continuation utility is too low. To see this more precisely, suppose that, at
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the outset of time t, the size of the project is Xt and the continuation utility of the agent is
Wt−(Γ,Λ). If there is a loss at time t, incentive compatibility requires that the continuation
utility be reduced by at least B(Xt)/∆λ. Downsizing can be avoided at this point only if the
new level of continuation utility is high enough that it is still possible to provide incentives
while satisfying the limited liability constraint, that is, if
Wt−(Γ,Λ)− B(Xt)
∆λ
≥ B(Xt)
∆λ
.
Thus downsizing must take place whenever Wt−(Γ,Λ) < 2B(Xt)/∆λ and there is a loss at
time t. Yet, it is hard to push the analysis of the optimal contract much further without
assuming constant returns to scale. Indeed, the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation now
writes as:
(55)
rF (Xt,Wt−) = Xt(µ− λC) + max{−Xt`t + (ρWt− + λHt −Xt`t)FW (Xt,Wt−)
+Xtgt[FX(Xt,Wt−)− c]
−λ[F (Xt,Wt−)− F (Xtxt,Wt− −Ht)]},
where the maximization in (55) is over the set of controls (gt, Ht, `t, xt) that satisfy (5), (18)
and the two constraints
(56)
Ht ≥ B(Xt)
∆λ
,
Wt− −Ht ≥ B(Xtxt)
∆λ
.
The first of these constraints is the agent’s date t incentive compatibility constraint, while
the second, which parallels (19), expresses the fact that if a loss occurs at date t, reducing
by Ht the continuation utility of the agent, it must still be possible to provide incentives
after this loss, which requires being able to further reduce the agent’s utility by B(Xtxt)/∆λ,
where Xtxt is the size of the firm after the date t loss. Unlike in the constant returns to
scale case, the non-linearity of B(X) with respect to X makes it impossible to reduce the
delay partial differential equation (55) to a delay ordinary differential equation.
While it is difficult to rigorously study the system (55) to (56) when B(X) is not linear in
X, one can perform a heuristic analysis similar to that of Section 4.1 for a small perturbation
of the private benefits function:
Bε(X) = BX + εXφ(X),
where ε is a small number and φ a bounded function. This analysis, which can be found
in the supplement to this paper (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve (2009)), suggests
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that, under regularity conditions, one can reasonably expect the qualitative properties of the
optimal contract to be upheld for such a small perturbation. The optimal contract could
then be depicted on a figure similar to Figure 1. The differences would be that the boundary
of the downsizing region would be the non-linear function Bε(X)/∆λ of firm size X instead
of the linear function Xb, and that the upper and lower boundaries of the Investment/No
transfers region would also presumably be non-linear functions of X.
7 Empirical Implications
While, in the first-best, firms in our model should always invest, in the second-best the
optimal contract stipulates that firms can invest only after a long enough record of good
performance, at least when the unit cost of investment is not too low.29 Such clauses are
consistent with the empirical results of Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2004), who find that venture
capital funding for new investment is contingent on financial and non-financial milestones.
They also find that such conditioning is more frequent when the proxy for agency problems
is more severe.
In our model, the optimal contract specifies that after good performance agents will
be compensated, while after bad performance the firm will be partial liquidated. This is
in line with the contractual clauses documented by Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003). The
circumstances in which downsizing takes place in the optimal contract can be interpreted
as financial distress. This is in line with the empirical findings of Denis and Shome (2005),
who report that financially distressed firms are often downsized.
In our model, small firms tend to be below the investment threshold. They are thus likely
to be exposed to financial constraints on investment, as documented by Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2005). Our model also predicts that small firms are relatively more fragile,
since a few negative shocks are enough to drive them into the zone where further losses
would trigger downsizing. Conversely, large firms that have enjoyed long periods of sustained
investment are more likely to have long records of good performance, which pushes them
away from that zone. Overall, the probability of downsizing is decreasing in firm size. This is
in line with the empirical findings of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989), who report that
failure rates decline with increases in firm or plant size. Note however that the same logic
implies that, according to our model, large firms should tend to have higher growth rates
than smaller ones, while data suggest that on average the opposite is true, see Evans (1987a,
1987b) and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989). Interestingly, though, Dunne, Roberts
29Throughout this section, we assume that f(b)− bf ′+(b) < c < c, so that wi > b.
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and Samuelson (1989) find that this pattern is reversed in the case of multiplant firms: mean
growth rates for plants owned by such firms tend to increase with size, reflecting that the
tendency for growth rates of plants to decline with size is outweighed by a substantial fall
in their failure rates. This evidence suggests that our analysis is particularly relevant for
multiplant firms. A further testable implication of our model is that downsizing decisions
should typically be followed by relatively long periods during which no investment takes
place, corresponding to the time it takes for the firm to reach the investment threshold again
and resume growing.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) note that different theoretical explanations have been offered
for variations in CEO pay. While some analyses emphasize incentive problems, Gabaix and
Landier (2008) propose to focus on firm size. Empirically, they find that CEO pay increases
with firm size. Consistent with these results, our incentive theoretic analysis implies that the
size of the firm and the compensation of the agent ought to be positively correlated: after a
long stream of good performance, the scale of operations is large, and so are the payments
to the agent. Conceptually, our analysis suggests that explanations based on size should
not be divorced from explanations based on incentives, and that investment and managerial
compensation are complementary incentive instruments, in line with the empirical findings
of Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003).
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the dynamic moral hazard problem arising when agents with limited
liability must exert costly unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively
infrequent losses. We characterize the optimal downsizing, investment and compensation
policies and provide explicit formulae for firm size and its asymptotic growth rate.
Our analysis generates policy and managerial implications for the prevention of large
risks. Losses in our model are negative externalities, since they affect society beyond the
managers’ or the firms’ ability to pay for the damages they cause. It is therefore natural
to think of the optimal dynamic contract as a regulatory tool. For instance, in the context
of financial institutions, our analysis suggests that, to prevent large losses, downsizing and
investment decisions should be made contingent on accumulated performance. This notably
provides a rationale for prudential regulations requesting that the scale at which financial
firms operate be proportionate to their capital. In particular, such regulations imply that
banks or insurance companies should be downsized if their capital before large losses is close
to the regulatory requirement. This is similar to our optimal contract, provided one interprets
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W as a proxy for capital, which is natural since both increase after good performance and
decrease after bad performance. Yet, our analysis suggests that such capital requirements
are not sufficient to induce an optimal level of risk prevention: they should be complemented
by an appropriate regulation of managerial compensation. More specifically, the managers’
compensation should be based on long-term track records, and it should be reduced after
large losses by an amount that increases with the private benefits from shirking and the
extent to which shirking is difficult to detect.
Our analysis also generates implications for firm size dynamics. Simon and Bonini (1958)
and Ijiri and Simon (1964) analyze the link between the stochastic process according to
which firms grow and the size distribution of firms. While these early works do not rely
on the characterization of optimal investment policies, they have been embedded within the
neoclassical framework, see for instance Lucas (1978) or Luttmer (2007, 2008). In these
models, firm growth is limited by technology. In Lucas (1978) managerial skills are assumed
to exhibit diminishing returns to scale, while in Luttmer (2008) it is assumed that, when
ideas are replicated, their quality depreciates. Our modeling framework offers an opportunity
to revisit these issues in a context where the endogenous limits to firm growth result from
moral hazard. A key issue in models of the size distribution of firms is whether Gibrat’s
law holds, that is, whether firm growth is independent of firm size. This is not the case
in our model, since firm size and downsizing and investment decisions are correlated in the
optimal contract, being all functions of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility process.
It would be interesting, in further research, to analyze the implications of our analysis for
the size distribution of firms.
Appendix: Sketches of Proofs
In this appendix, we shall merely outline the structure of the proofs. The interested reader
will find complete proofs in the supplement to this paper (Biais, Mariotti, Rochet and
Villeneuve (2009)). All the references thereafter made to sections and auxiliary results
correspond to this supplementary document.
Proof of Lemma 1 (sketch). The predictable representation (12) of the martingale
U(Γ,Λ) follows from Bre´maud (1981, Chapter III, Theorems T9 and T17). The factor
e−ρs in (12) is just a convenient rescaling. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1 (sketch). The proof extends Sannikov’s (2008, Proposition 2)
arguments to the case where output is modeled as a point process. Q.E.D.
34
Proof of Proposition 2 (sketch). It turns out to be more convenient to work with the
size-adjusted social value function, defined by v(w) = f(w)+w for all w ≥ 0. Just as f , the
function v is linear over [0, b]. From (33) and (35), one has
(57) rv(w) = µ− λC − (ρ− r)w + Lv(w)
for all w ∈ (b, wi], and
(58) (r − γ)v(w) = µ− λC − γc− (ρ− r)w + Lγv(w)
for all w ∈ (wi, wp]. The investment threshold wi satisfies
(59) wi = inf {w > b |v(w)− wv′(w) > c},
while the payment threshold wp satisfies
(60) v′(wp) = 0.
Finally, v is constant and equal to v(wp) over [wp,∞). The proof consists of two main parts.
In the first part of the proof (Section C.1), we first suppose that investment is not feasible,
that is γ = 0. This allows us to pin down the constant c in (40), and provides key insights
into the properties of the solution to (41) in the no investment region (b, wi]. In the second
part of the proof (Section C.2), we suppose that investment is feasible, that is γ > 0, and
we use the results of the first part of the proof to solve (41).
Part 1 In the no investment case, we look for the maximal solution to (57) that satisfies
(60) at some payment threshold. Note that the only unknown parameter is the slope of that
solution over [0, b]. To determine that slope, we use the following shooting method. For each
β ≥ 0, denote by vβ the function that is linear with slope β over [0, b] and then satisfies
(57) over (b,∞). One can show that vβ can be decomposed over R+ as u1 + βu2, where u2
is a positive function with strictly positive derivative.30 This implies that the derivatives of
the functions (vβ)β≥0 are strictly increasing with respect to β (Proposition C.1.1). We then
prove that the ratio −u′1/u′2 attains a maximum β0 over (b,∞), which implies that vβ0 is the
maximal function in the family (vβ)β≥0 whose derivative has a zero in (b,∞) (Proposition
C.1.2). Thus vβ0 is the desired maximal solution. Let w
p
β0
be the first point at which v′β0
vanishes. The last step of the proof then consists in showing that vβ0 is concave over [0, w
p
β0
],
and strictly so over [b, wpβ0 ] (Proposition C.1.3). As explained in the text, the cost threshold
c below which investment is strictly profitable is vβ0(w
p
β0
). For c > c, the size-adjusted social
value function is vβ0 ∧ vβ0(wpβ0) (Section D.2, Remark).
30The functions u1, u2 and vβ are continuously differentiable except at b.
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Part 2 In the investment case, we look for the maximal solution to (57) and (58) that
satisfies (59) and (60) at some investment and payment thresholds. As in Part 1, the only
unknown parameter is the slope of v over [0, b]. To determine that slope, which must clearly
be higher than β0, we use the following shooting method. For each β ≥ β0, denote by vβ,γ
the function that is linear with slope β over [0, b] and then satisfies (57) over (b, wiβ] and (58)
over (wiβ,∞), where wiβ = inf {w > b | vβ,γ(w) − wv′β,γ(w) > c}. One may have wiβ = b, in
which case the region (b, wiβ] is empty. We first show that vβ,γ is well-defined, and that the
threshold wiβ belongs to [b, w
p
β0
) and continuously decreases as β increases (Lemma C.2.1).
Key to this result is the fact that u2 is strictly concave over [b,∞). We then show that,
in analogy with the functions (vβ)β≥0, the derivatives of the functions (vβ,γ)β≥β0 are strictly
increasing with respect to β (Proposition C.2.1). The next step of the proof, which is crucial,
consists in showing that there exists a maximal function vβγ ,γ in the family (vβ,γ)β≥β0 whose
derivative has a zero in (b,∞) (Proposition C.2.2). To establish this result, we first show
that the set of β ≥ β0 such that v′β,γ has a zero over (b,∞) is a nonempty interval I that
contains β0 (Lemma C.2.2). Second, we show that I has a finite upper bound βγ, so that v
′
β,γ
has no zero in (b,∞) when β > βγ (Lemma C.2.3). Third, letting wpβ,γ be the first point at
which v′β,γ vanishes for any given β ∈ I, we show that wpβ,γ is strictly increasing with respect
to β over I and converges to a finite limit when β converges to βγ from below (Lemma
C.2.4). Fourth, we show that the derivatives of the functions (vβ,γ)β≥β0 vary continuously
with β, which in turn implies that I contains its upper bound βγ (Lemma C.2.5). Thus
vβγ ,γ is the desired maximal solution, and w
p
βγ ,γ
is the first point at which v′βγ ,γ vanishes.
The last step of the proof then consists in showing that vβγ ,γ is concave over [0, w
p
βγ ,γ
], and
strictly so over [b, wpβγ ,γ] (Proposition C.2.3). Key to this result is the fact that βγ > β0 and
that the maximal solution vβ0 derived in the no investment case is concave over [0, w
p
β0
] as
established in Proposition C.1.3. Finally, letting f(w) = vβγ ,γ(w)∧ vβγ ,γ(wpβγ ,γ) for all w ≥ 0
and writing wi = wiβγ and w
p = wiβγ ,γ to simplify notation, it is immediate to check that the
triple (f, wi, wp) satisfies all the properties stated in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 3 (sketch). The argument follows somewhat standard lines in
optimal control theory. In the first step of the proof, we establish that F provides an upper
bound for the expected payoff that the principal can obtain from any incentive compatible
contract inducing maximal risk prevention, that is:
(61) F (X0,W0−) ≥ E
[∫ τ
0
e−rt{Xt[(µ− gtc)dt− CdNt]− dLt}
]
for any contract Γ = (X,L, τ) inducing maximal risk prevention. For any such contract, the
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dynamics of the agent’s continuation utilityW is given by (13), for a process H that satisfies
the incentive compatibility condition (14). Substituting X and L from Γ into the function
F , and applying the change of variable formula for processes of locally bounded variation
(Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, Chapter VI, Section 92)) yields
F (X0,W0−) = e
−rTF (XT+ ,WT ) −
∫ T
0
e−rt[(ρWt− + λHt)FW (Xt,Wt−)− rF (Xt,Wt−)] dt
−
∫ T
0
e−rtFX(Xt,Wt−) (dX
d,c
t +Xtgt dt)
(62)
+
∫ T
0
e−rtFW (Xt,Wt−) dLct
−
∑
t∈[0,T ]
e−rt[F (Xt+ ,Wt)− F (Xt,Wt−)]
for all T ∈ [0, τ), where Xd,c and Lc stand for the pure continuous parts of Xd and L.
Imposing limited liability and incentive compatibility, along with the homogeneity of F , the
concavity of f and the fact that f ′+ ≥ −1, we show that, in expectation, the right-hand side
of (62) is greater than that of (61).
In the second step of the proof, we establish that the contract described in Proposition 3
yields the principal a value F (X0,W0−). This contract must therefore be optimal, since, from
the first step of the proof, F (X0,W0−) is an upper bound for the value that the principal
can derive from any contract that induces maximal risk prevention. Specifically, we start
from (62) and we use the properties of the contract spelled out in Properties 1 to 6, and
more precisely described in Proposition 3, to show that, in expectation, the right-hand side
of (62) is in this case equal to that of (61). Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 4 (sketch). In the first step of the proof, we establish that the
process {wTk}k≥1 is Markov ergodic and then rely on the strong law of large numbers for
Markov ergodic processes (Stout (1974, Theorem 3.6.7)) to show that
(63) lim
t→∞
1
t
Nt−∑
k=1
ln
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
= λ
∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw),
P–almost surely. The main technical difficulty consists in proving that the integral on the
right-hand side of (63) is finite.
In the second step of the proof, we establish that
(64) lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ TN
t−
0
1{ws>wi} ds = 1− λ
∫
[b,wi)×R+
(tw,wi ∧ s) µw+⊗ λ(dw, ds),
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P–almost surely. The argument goes as follows. Consider for each k ≥ 1 the integral
Ik =
∫ Tk
Tk−1
1{ws>wi} ds, where T0 = 0 by convention. If wT+k−1 ≥ w
i, then ws > w
i for all
s ∈ (Tk−1, Tk], and thus Ik = Tk − Tk−1. If wT+k−1 < w
i and Tk − Tk−1 ≤ tw
T+
k−1
,wi , then
ws ≤ wi for all s ∈ (Tk−1, Tk], and thus Ik = 0. Last, if wT+k−1 < w
i and Tk−Tk−1 > tw
T+
k−1
,wi ,
then ws > w
i for all s ∈ (Tk−1 + tw
T+
k−1
,wi , Tk], and thus Ik = Tk − Tk−1 − tw
T+
k−1
,wi . Summing
over k = 1, . . . , n and rearranging yields
(65)
1
n
∫ Tn
0
1{ws>wi} ds =
1
n
n∑
k=1
(Tk − Tk−1)− 1
n
n∑
k=1
[
tw
T+
k−1
,wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
for all n ≥ 1. Since the random variables (Tk − Tk−1)k≥1 are independently and identically
distributed according to the exponential distribution λ, it follows from the strong law of
large numbers that the sequence
(
1
n
∑n
k=1(Tk−Tk−1)
)
n≥1 converges P–almost surely to 1/λ.
Furthermore, we show that the process {(wT+k−1 , Tk − Tk−1)}k≥1 is Markov ergodic, with
invariant measure µw+⊗λ over [b, wp]× R+. Since the function (w, s) 7→ (tw,wi ∧ s)1{w<wi}
is measurable, positive and bounded above by (w, s) 7→ s, and hence µw+⊗λ–integrable,
it follows from the strong law of large numbers for Markov ergodic processes (Stout (1974,
Theorem 3.6.7)) that the sequence
(
1
n
∑n
k=1
[
tw
T+
k−1
,wi ∧ (Tk−Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
)
n≥1 converges
P–almost surely to∫
[b,wp]×R+
(tw,wi ∧ s)1{w<wi} µw+⊗λ(dw, dt) =
∫
[b,wi)×R+
(tw,wi ∧ s) µw+⊗λ(dw, dt).
Using the fact that Nt−/t converges P–almost surely to λ as t goes to ∞ by the strong law
of large numbers for the Poisson process then yields (64).
In the last step of the proof, we establish that
(66) lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
TN
t−
1{ws>wi} ds = 0,
P–almost surely. Merging (63), (64) and (66) finally leads to (48). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 (sketch). We first check that (49) holds uniformly in γ whenever
c is close enough to 0. This implies that the expression (48) for the long-run growth rate of
the firm simplifies to
(67) lim
t→∞
ln(Xt)
t
= λ
∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw) + γ.
The remainder of the proof consists in constructing upper and lower bounds for the integral
on the right-hand side of (67).
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To construct the upper bound we first define wp = (µ − λC)/(ρ − r) and show that
wp < wp uniformly in γ. We then define auxiliary processes {wt}t≥0 and {lt}t≥0 by
wt = w0 +
∫ t−
0
{
(ρws + λb) ds− b
(
ws − b
b
∧ 1
)
dNs − dls
}
,
lt = max{w0 − wp, 0}+
∫ t
0
(ρwp + λb)1{ws+=wp} ds
for all t ≥ 0, that are independent of γ. It is easy to check that wt ≤ wt for all t ≥ 0 and
that {wTk}k≥1 has a unique stationary initial distribution µw. Furthermore∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw) ≤
∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw) < 0,
uniformly in γ, which yields the desired upper bound. The strict inequality follows from
the fact that for each k ≥ 1 and w ∈ (b, wp], there is a strictly positive probability that
wTk+1 < w given that wTk+1 ≥ w, which implies that the lower bound of the support of the
stationary initial distribution µw of {wTk}k≥1 is b. Therefore, for γ close enough to 0,
λ
∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw) + γ < 0,
which establishes (50).
The lower bound is provided by the fact that
∫
[b,2b)
ln((w − b)/b)µw(dw) is finite (Section
E, Proof of Proposition 4, Claim 1, Step 2). Specifically, one can show that∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw) ≥ − λ
ρ− γ + λ,
uniformly in γ. Therefore, if γ > λ2/(ρ− γ + λ),
λ
∫
[b,2b)
ln
(
w − b
b
)
µw(dw) + γ > 0,
which establishes (51). Q.E.D.
Proof for Proposition 6 (sketch). Consider for each k ≥ 1 the σ–fields
Fk1 = σ((w0, T1 − T0), (wT1 , T2 − T1), . . . , (wTk−1 , Tk − Tk−1)),
F∞k = σ((wTk−1 , Tk − Tk−1), (wTk , Tk+1 − Tk), . . .),
and denote by
T =
∞⋂
k=1
F∞k
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the corresponding tail σ–field. The first step of the proof consists in showing that for each
E ∈ T , either P[E] = 0 or P[E] = 1. To establish this zero-one law, we first show that, for
each ε > 0, there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that
(68)
∆(k, n, w, t, A) = P[(wTk+n−1 , Tk+n − Tk+n−1) ∈ A |(wTk−1 , Tk − Tk−1) = (w, t)]
−P[(wTk+n−1 , Tk+n − Tk+n−1 ∈ A)]
≤ ε
for all k ≥ 1, n ≥ n0, (w, t) ∈ [b, wp] × R+ and A ∈ B([b, wp] × R+). Following Ba´rtfai and
Re´ve´sz (1967, Example 2), one can then show that a consequence of condition (68) is that
for each ε > 0, there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that the following mixing property holds:
(69) P[E |Fk1 ]−P[E] ≤ ε
for all k ≥ 1, n ≥ n0, and E ∈ F∞k+n, P–almost surely. Fix some E ∈ T , so that in particular
E ∈ F∞k+n for all n ≥ n0. Since ε is arbitrary, the mixing property (69) then implies that
P[E |Fk1 ] ≤ P[E] for all k ≥ 1, P–almost surely. From Doob (1953, Chapter VII, Theorem
4.3), it follows that P[E |∨∞k=1Fk1 ] ≤ P[E], P–almost surely. Since E ∈ T ⊂ ∨∞k=1Fk1 , one
finally has P[E] =
∫
E
P[E |∨∞k=1Fk1 ] dP ≤ ∫E P[E] dP = P[E]2. Thus either P[E] = 0 or
P[E] = 1, as claimed.
The second step of the proof consists in showing that each of the events {limn→∞XTn = 0}
and {limn→∞XT+n =∞} belongs to T . First consider {limn→∞XTn = 0}. Fix some k0 ≥ 1.
For each n ≥ k0 + 1, one has
XTn = X0
N
T−n∏
k=1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(∫ Tn
0
γ1{ws>wi} ds
)
= X0
n−1∏
k=1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(
γ
{
n∑
k=1
(Tk − Tk−1)−
n∑
k=1
[
tw
T+
k−1
,wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
})
= XTk0
n−1∏
k=k0
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(
γ
{
n∑
k=k0+1
(Tk − Tk−1)−
n∑
k=k0+1
[
tw
T+
k−1
,wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
})
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with
∏
∅ = 1 by convention, where the second equality follows from (65) and from the
fact that NT−n = n − 1. Since XTk0 is a strictly positive random variable, it follows that
{limn→∞XTn = 0} ∈ F∞k0+1. Since k0 is arbitrary, {limn→∞XTn = 0} ∈ T . The proof for
{limn→∞XT+n =∞} is similar, observing that
XT+n = XT+k0
n∏
k=k0+1
(
wTk − b
b
∧ 1
)
exp
(
γ
{
n∑
k=k0+1
(Tk − Tk−1)−
n∑
k=k0+1
[
tw
T+
k−1
,wi ∧ (Tk − Tk−1)
]
1{w
T+
k−1
<wi}
})
and that XT+k0
is a finite random variable.
Finally, to conclude the proof, one verifies that {limt→∞Xt = 0} = {limn→∞XTn = 0}
and {limt→∞Xt =∞} = {limn→∞XT+n =∞}. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Define wpβ0 as in the proof of Proposition 2. One can show that
(70) rf(wt) ≥ µ− λC + (ρwt + λb)f ′(wt)− λ[f(wt)− f(wt − b)]
for any value of wt > b, with equality if wt ∈ (b, wpβ0 ] (Section D.2, Remark). Hence a
sufficient condition for (54) to hold is that the right-hand side of (70) be larger than the
right-hand side of (54), which is the case if
(71) ∆λ[C + bf ′(wt)] ≥ λ[f(wt)− f(wt − b)− bf ′(wt)]
since b = B/∆λ. The right-hand side of (71) is positive by concavity of f , and it is bounded
as f is affine over (wpβ0 ,∞). Consider next the left-hand side of (71). By (2), one has C > b,
reflecting that maximal risk prevention is socially optimal in the first-best.31 Since f ′ ≥ −1,
this implies that the mapping C+bf ′ is positive and bounded away from 0. Since f depends
on B and ∆λ only through their ratio b, it follows that (71) is satisfied for any value of
wt > b when ∆λ is high enough, while B is proportionally adjusted so as to keep b constant.
The result follows. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1 This figure depicts the four regions that characterize the optimal contract. We
have represented a situation in which the contract is initiated at a point (X0,W0−) that lies
in the interior of the transfer region; when transfers take place later on, the state variables
move along the straight line Wt− = Xtw
p.
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Figure 2 The top panel depicts a sample path for the agent’s size-adjusted continuation
utility. The bottom panel depicts the corresponding path for the evolution of firm size.
Investment takes place as long as wt > w
i. Losses occur at times T1 to T5. Because at T1,
T2 and T3, wTk > 2b, losses at these times induce a drop of b in continuation utility and no
downsizing. By contrast, at T4 and T5, wTk < 2b, so that losses at these times induce a drop
of wTk−b in continuation utility, and downsizing by an amount XTk−X+Tk = (2−wTk/b)XTk .
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Figure 3 This figure depicts the joint evolution of firm size and of the agent’s continuation
utility for the sample path of the agent’s size-adjusted continuation utility illustrated on
Figure 2. Dashed curves correspond to downward jumps in the agent’s continuation utility
triggered by losses at times T1 to T5, and horizontal dashed lines correspond to downsizing
at times T4 and T5. Arrows indicate the direction of evolution of the state variables as long
as no losses occur.
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